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The Pragmatic ‘Little Red Dot’: 
Singapore’s US Hedge  
Against China
Robyn Klingler Vidra 
We are a little red dot but we are a special red dot. We are connected with the 
world, we play a special role. And we are not going to be in anybody’s pocket.  
- Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, 2009
The cornerstones of Singaporean foreign policy towards the United States and China are constituted by security considerations, economic liberalism and a dedication to pragmatic 
non-alignment. Above all, pragmatism has led the Singaporean approach to the Eastern and 
Western powers. Diplomatically, Singapore aims to be neutral and free from alliances, even 
in its close relations with both the US and China. Security-wise, Singapore has called for the 
involvement of the US in Asia Pacific across the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods as a hedge 
to local regional powers, particularly in light of China’s military modernisation. Access to the 
large American consumer market has been considered crucial to Singapore’s economic ‘miracle’ 
but the American share of trade has declined in recent years as trade with Asian partners, and 
particularly with China, has accelerated. Singapore maximises economic opportunities through 
growing market ties with China, while avoiding bandwagoning. Singapore hedges its cultural, 
spatial and economic proximity to China with robust diplomatic, military and economic relations 
with the US and through regional participation in ASEAN and international organisations. By 
doing so, Singapore pursues its grand desire to remain uniquely Singaporean.
Singapore punches above its weight. For a state with a mere five million residents and 700 square 
kilometres of land, its economic production, security position and political leadership in Southeast Asia 
are remarkable. Singapore’s significance is also demonstrated by the time and attention it has received 
from great powers, including the US and China. The ‘Little Red Dot’ phrase comes from Former Indonesian 
President B.J. Habibie’s remark during the Asian Financial Crisis, claiming that the non-green (i.e. non-
Muslim Malay) state of Singapore was neither a friend nor of significance to him. Months later, Habibie’s 
Indonesia faltered and was forced to seek help from the Little Red Dot of Singapore, among others, and 
the well-capitalised island nation acquiesced. To assure its own survival, small but significant Singapore has 
aided its neighbours when in need – due to financial crisis or natural disaster – regardless of ideological 
or cultural differences. Yet it has passionately avoided overly close alliance with, or becoming a ‘satellite’ 
of, regional great powers, be it the United States, Japan or China. 
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HISTORY, CULTURE AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
Domestic cultural concerns act as a magnified mirror 
for regional concerns vis-à-vis China, Malaysia and 
Indonesia in particular, and are increasingly prominent 
in Singapore’s foreign policy formulations. From the 
time that Sir Stamford Raffles claimed Singapore as a 
colonial territory for the British East India Company in 
1819, Singapore has been a society of multi-cultural 
immigrants. Singaporeans are ethnically Chinese 
(74 percent), Malay (13 percent) and Indian (9 percent). 
This diverse population shares a turbulent history, from 
the end of British colonial rule to the exit of Japanese 
occupiers after World War II and separation from 
the Malaysian Federation in 1965. From the birth of 
the Singaporean state, the predominantly Chinese 
political leadership sought policies that would instil 
a Singaporean identity, rather than prompt further 
racial tensions. To foster multiculturalism, and create 
an internationally competitive labour force, English 
was chosen as the primary language in the education 
system, along with each student also needing to study 
in their home language (Mandarin, Tamil or Malay). 
Despite the Hokkien background of the Singapore 
Chinese, the government adopted a ‘Speak Mandarin’ 
campaign in 1979 to aid in the country’s global 
competitiveness and to capitalise on the opportunities 
presented by China. Singapore’s language selection is 
telling of its pragmatism and balancing of Chinese 
and English markets. Its political leadership thus 
ensures economic relevance by having the citizenry 
speak English and Mandarin, but maintains Asian 
culture and ethnic diversity by retaining Singapore’s 
multilingual nature. 
In addition to Singapore’s ethnic diversity, there have 
also been significant immigration flows to the Lion 
City. This phenomenon has recently sparked political 
controversy, including the 2011 ‘Curry Wars’, 
which began in response to complaints lodged by 
a Chinese family about the smell coming from the 
flats of their Indian neighbours cooking curries. The 
backlash to this anti-curry action ignited protests, as 
Indian and Malay residents felt the Chinese majority 
was suppressing their culture. This is not the first 
time racially-motivated protests have been staged 
in Singapore - there were violent race riots in 1964 
and 1969. The recent Curry Wars are said to be a 
manifestation of the rising frustrations over the 
number of Chinese immigrants to Singapore; there 
are now more than 1 million Chinese nationals living 
in the country. It is not only Chinese immigrants, 
however, who have moved to the island. The country 
is a melting pot for ex-patriot business professionals. 
22 percent of its non-resident immigrants are skilled 
workers and professionals – many of whom are 
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Figure 1: Singapore Population growth 1970 - 2010
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics
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American and European – and foreign workers account 
for approximately 37 percent of Singapore’s population 
of 5,077,000. Non-residents, including both unskilled 
foreign workers and professional expatriates, have 
risen from 60,000 in 1960 to 1.3 million by 2010, in 
the context of a doubling of the resident population 
(see figure 1). The rising population aggravates 
existing strains on the provision of resources, and 
threatens to intensify cultural tensions in an already-
sensitive multi-cultural environment. Population 
growth has exacerbated controversial issues, including 
the overheated housing market and concerns over 
becoming a Chinese satellite. Despite these tensions, 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s National Day rally 
speech in 2011 reiterated the historic importance of 
immigration and foreign talent to Singapore, and he 
encouraged his citizens to ‘accept the discomfort’ 
associated with crowding more people onto the island.
Rising social tensions have been accompanied by a 
strengthening critique of the single party leadership by 
the People’s Action Party (PAP). PAP ruled Singapore 
under Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister from 1965 
to 1990. The following two Prime Ministers, first 
Goh Chok Tong, and then Mr. Lee’s eldest son, Lee 
Hsien Loong, who took office in 2004, were also 
drawn from the party. The PAP had won between 
61 and 86 percent of seats in each election since 
independence from Malaysia in 1965. In May, 2011 
PAP suffered its worst election result since the state’s 
formation, in which it won only 60 percent of the 
vote and the Workers’ Party secured five seats, an 
outcome that has been dubbed the ‘Singapore Spring’. 
Responding to this heightened cynicism, PAP’s political 
leadership launched an independent inquiry into their 
compensation packages, the result of which was the 
well-publicised announcement in January 2012 that 
the world’s best paid head of state, Lee Hsien Loong, 
would take a 50 percent salary cut. Singapore boasts 
one of the world’s least corrupt political systems, which 
according to PAP is precisely because they are well 
paid and therefore not incentivised to take bribes or 
to partake in excessive fundraising activities. In fact, 
the World Economic Forum has ranked Singapore the 
strongest institutional environment globally due to its 
lack of corruption, political stability and high level of 
Government transparency. However, even this long-
defended PAP position was chipped away following 
the result of the 2011 elections. 
Rising cultural and political tensions domestically 
continue to necessitate care in foreign policy decisions. 
Despite having a Chinese majority, Singapore is neither 
bandwagoning with China nor seeking to distance 
itself from the People’s Republic, as a neutral policy 
is required to avoid sparking further domestic unrest. 
Cultural differences have not substantially affected 
Singapore’s relationship with the United States, despite 
what Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has suggested to 
be a substantive difference between Singapore’s Asian 
values and those of the US. Singapore, like some of its 
ASEAN peers, welcomes the Obama administration’s 
‘pivot’ back to the Asia Pacific region, regardless 
of domestic political differences. Going forward, 
Singapore will continue to tread carefully with its 
foreign policy towards China and Muslim  states, as 
foreign policy toward these states can give rise to 
further domestic difficulties.
 
ECONOMIC DRIVERS
Economic success has long been considered crucial 
to the survival of the Singaporean state. One of the 
Asian Tigers - and considered an economic miracle by 
many- Singapore went from a ‘third world country to 
a first world nation’ in one generation, according to 
the title of Lee Kuan Yew’s 2000 book. Since 1965 
Singapore has balanced single-party leadership and 
state intervention in the economy with active global 
economic integration. The government has set the 
agenda for private sector activities and has also created 
industries through state-owned enterprises, such 
as the internationally acclaimed Singapore Airlines. 
Also central to Singapore’s competitive efforts has 
been the courting of multi-national companies that 
have brought capital, technology and management 
expertise, as well as providing access to foreign markets 
and well-paid jobs. Singapore has integrated into fast 
growing areas of the world economy, becoming a hub 
for semiconductor manufacturing, the busiest port in 
the world, and a global financial centre. In addition, 
the state itself is well capitalised as a result of policies 
such as the mandatory pension contributions to the 
70
In recent years the United States’ percentage share 
of Singapore’s total imports and exports decreased, 
while Singapore’s share of trade with China has 
increased since the Financial Crisis. As of 2011, 70 
percent of Singapore’s total trade was with Asian 
trading partners and two of its top trading partners 
are members of ASEAN (Malaysia and Indonesia). 
Singapore’s EU trade in 2011 accounted for just 
6.3% of its total trade, while trade with its ASEAN 
partners (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam) represented 26.3%. Figure 3 demonstrates 
the regional economic integration Singapore has 
achieved, as well as the positions of the US and China 
as key trade partners.
Over the last decade in particular, Singapore, as well 
as Hong Kong, has strived to be a hub for foreign 
investment into China. The Chinese-speaking island 
nations promote their infrastructure, local language 
skills and cultural affinity with China as their competitive 
advantages. However, fears are that as confidence in 
Chinese institutions grows then these advantages will 
diminish, with the result that Singapore would lose FDI 
as investors deal in China directly. Singapore therefore 
sees its strategic relationship with the US as a hedge 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics
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Figure 2: Singapore’s Trade with the US and China as percent of total trade figures
Central Provident Fund. Today Singapore boasts one 
of the world’s largest official foreign reserves of over 
$237 billion, which gives it the financial independence 
to pursue non-alignment strategies.
Singapore has deliberately forged close economic 
relations with regional, middle and great powers to 
achieve its economic goals. Singapore has signed 
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with both 
China (the CSFTA in 2009) and the US (the USSFTA 
in 2004) to continue delivering on this priority. Despite 
Singapore’s small size, it is an important partner to 
the world’s largest economies. It is the largest trading 
partner for China in Southeast Asia, and the 2004 
USFTA was the first bilateral trade agreement that 
the US signed with any Asian country. Despite robust 
trade with the US and China, Singapore’s policymakers 
are clear in their desire to not fall into economic 
dependence on either partner. Access to both markets 
is important, but maintaining trading relationships with 
other states, particularly its ASEAN +3 (which includes 
Japan and Korea in addition to China) partners, is 
similarly pursued. To avoid too large of a concentration, 
the share of Singaporean trade with the US and China 
has hovered around a maximum of 10 percent each 
(see figure 2). 
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against increasing Chinese economic dominance, 
and uses its deepening engagement with its ASEAN 
partners as another avenue to diversify away from 
China economically.
 
MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
Military prowess is important to Singapore, as 
demonstrated by its world class Singapore Armed 
Forces, military conscription, and relatively high 
defence spending. However, it would be wrong to 
view Singaporean foreign policy primarily though 
a hard power or military security lens. Singapore 
maintains a ‘Total Defence Policy’, striving to defend 
itself from attacks across economic, military, civil, 
social and psychological spheres. For Singapore, 
military capability, together with economic success 
and social cohesion, is an essential ingredient of its 
longevity. The tenets of economic liberalism, along 
with an active military deterrent, have been central 
to Singapore’s overall strategy, complemented by a 
diplomatic independence in foreign policy that in Lee 
Kuan Yew’s words has seen the state strive to not be 
‘anti-any country’, but rather only pro-Singapore. 
There is an ideological commitment to pragmatism 
and impartiality that guides Singaporean military and 
diplomatic relations, including its close and complex 
interactions with the United States and China.
Singapore’s political leaders have supported the active 
role of the United States in the region across the Cold 
War and post-Cold War periods, as a ‘hedge’ against 
the rise of its neighbours, notably Indonesia and 
China. Despite disagreements over democratic and 
human rights issues such as freedom of speech and 
an independent judiciary, the US-Singapore bilateral 
relationship has been close, both diplomatically 
and security-wise. Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew 
and others have long-standing relationships with 
American political leaders. As a testament of their 
close diplomatic and military ties, since 1999 the 
Changi naval port has been used by the American navy, 
with approximately 100 ships stopping in Singapore 
each year. The expansion of the US-Singapore naval 
relationship followed the reduction of the US naval 
presence in the Philippines in 1992. However, concerns 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (2012).  
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about US military capacity are bubbling to the surface, 
particularly following the January 2012 announcement 
that the US would cut approximately $500 billion in 
defence spending.
Unlike the long-established US-Singapore relationship, 
Sino-Singapore diplomatic relations only began in 
1990. In the early years, Singapore and its ASEAN 
partners were sceptical of China’s motives and 
approached the relationship with apprehension. Today, 
however, much of the remaining tension between 
Singapore and China relate to Singapore’s relationship 
with Taiwan. This issue has not been at the centre 
of Sino-Singapore relations since a 2006 PAP visit 
to Taipei, though concerns about tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait are beginning to resurface. For now, 
Chinese diplomatic relations with Singapore continue 
to flourish, and in 2010, to mark twenty years of 
Sino-Singapore relations, Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong met with Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping 
and outlined areas for further collaboration. More 
robust relations between governments, in information 
sharing, and culturally, through exchange programmes, 
were specifically mentioned as priority areas in which 
China and Singapore could work on to improve their 
collaboration in regional and multilateral issues. 
Of course, an area that is noticeably absent in 
Singapore’s relationship with China is military 
collaboration. Singapore’s security relationships 
continue to be dominated by the United States 
rather than China. This is not unusual for ASEAN 
states and others, as China’s ‘peaceful rise’ has not 
been accompanied by any notable military alliances. 
Instead, China’s military rise has been unilateral, and is 
a process that is gaining momentum through China’s 
military spending and modernisation efforts. The 
further build-up of the largest active army in the world, 
with 2.3 million soldiers, has provided the impetus 
for increased military spending across Asian states. 
Australia, Korea and Indonesia have increased defence 
budgets, and Singapore’s defence spending in 2011 
was up to $12 billion, which accounts for 6 percent of 
GDP. In addition to local increases in military capacity, 
the United States’ role as the military balancer has 
become even more important in a region increasingly 
concerned about China’s rise, territorial claims over 
islands, and instability on the Korean peninsula. 
However, given weakening American military and 
economic might, and projections that China’s military 
spending may surpass the US by 2035, the power 
of the US security hedging role may be diminishing. 
 
CONCLUSION
Pragmatism is the virtue guiding Singaporean foreign 
policymaking. From its days as a new state in the 
1960s, keeping the Little Red Dot on the map has 
been the priority. Within the domestic context, social 
cohesion, conscientious public service, and a first world 
quality of life have been avenues through which the 
single-party Singaporean government has sought to 
achieve stability. Externally, maintaining close and 
fruitful relationships with major – as well as minor 
and middle –powers has similarly been part of its 
Total Defence strategy. Singapore has viewed the rise 
of China as an opportunity to be a regional hub for 
investment flows and as a driver of economic attention 
to the region. However, Singaporeans are adamant 
that they will not become a satellite of China, or any 
other great power. As a result, whilst Sino-Singapore 
relations continue to deepen, Singapore is diversifying 
its economic and security interests, particularly through 
its encouragement of an American presence in the 
South China Sea as a hedge against China’s regional 
aspirations. The US-Singapore relationship is long-
established and positive across economic, military, and 
diplomatic spheres. Though democratic and cultural 
understandings may differ, this has not marred the 
overall relationship, and America’s commitment to 
Asia, in light of regional tensions and China’s military 
rise, has been welcomed by Singapore. 
Domestic political and cultural tensions, such as the 
Curry Wars in August 2011, and the ‘Singapore 
Spring’ election result in May 2011, have shown that 
Singapore’s people increasingly want their voices heard 
in domestic and foreign policy matters. No longer is it 
assumed that PAP knows what is best, and the well-
educated, well-travelled and ambitious populations are 
making their opinions known. They want a mutually 
beneficial relationship with China, but not an endless 
flow of immigrants, or to be overwhelmed by Chinese 
culture. Singaporeans want to continue sending their 
best and brightest students to the United States for 
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university, and for the American presence in East Asia 
to persist. Despite the increase in domestic cultural 
and political activism, young Singaporeans are still 
lamenting that Singapore’s future will be characterised 
by pragmatic partnerships with states and foreign 
corporations in both the West and East. 
Despite shifts in external and domestic conditions, 
the philosophy guiding Singapore’s foreign policy 
strategies, particularly with respect to the US and China, 
remains pragmatic. President Obama’s rededication of 
American interest to the region confirms the status 
quo for Singaporean objectives – of keeping the US 
active in Asia as a hedge against rising powers and 
as a provider of stability. Singapore continues to grow 
ever closer economically, culturally and diplomatically 
with China, but the ‘Little Red Dot’ is careful to not 
be subsumed by the emerging Asian superpower. 
Singapore will remain, just as its well-trodden tourism 
slogan boasts, uniquely Singapore. ■
